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Abstract
We study substitution from xed-line to mobile voice access, and the role of various
complementarities that may slow down this process. We use a rich survey data of 160,363
households from 27 EU countries during 2005-2011. We estimate a discrete choice model
where households may choose one or both technologies, possibly in combination with internet
access. We obtain the following main ndings. First, there is signicant xed-to-mobile
substitution, especially in recent years: without mobile telephony, xed-line penetration
would have been 14.1% higher at the end of 2011. But there is substantial heterogeneity
across households and EU regions, with a stronger substitution in Central and Eastern
European countries. Second, the decline in xed telephony has been slowed down because of
a signicant complementarity between the xed-line and mobile connections oered by the
xed-line incumbent operator. This gives the incumbent a possibility to protect its position
in the xed-line market, raising market share by 2.7%, and to leverage it into the mobile
market, raising market share by 5.4% points. Third, the decline in xed telephony has also
been slowed down because of the complementarity with broadband internet: the introduction
Financial support from the NET Institute, www.NETinst.org is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Marc
Bourreau, Yutec Sun, Steen Hoerning and participants at the 2014 ICT Conference at Telecom ParisTech, 2014
FSR C&M scientic seminar at the Florence School of Regulation, 12th Annual IIOC Conference in Chicago and
2014 CRESSE Conference in Korfu for helpful comments. All errors are our own.
yTelecom ParisTech, Department of Economics and Social Sciences, 46 rue Barrault, 75013 Paris, France.
E-mail: lukasz@mushroomski.com
zUniversity of Leuven and CEPR (London), Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium. E-mail:
Frank.Verboven@kuleuven.be
1
of DSL avoided an additional decline in xed-line penetration of 8.7% points at the end of
2011. The emergence of xed broadband has thus been the main source through which
incumbents maintain their strong position in the xed-line network.
Keywords: xed-to-mobile substitution; incumbency advantage; broadband access
JEL Classication: L13, L43, L96
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1 Introduction
At the start of the 1990s, telecommunications industries in the European Union were controlled
by state monopolies which transmitted phone calls using the xed-line copper network. There
were a small number of mobile phone users via analog networks (1G), which in most of the EU
countries were operated by the subsidiaries of the xed-line incumbents. This situation changed
dramatically during the last two decades. First, in the early 1990s several competing mobile
operators started to deploy voice services based on second generation (2G) technologies GSM-
900 and DCS-1800. Second, after the liberalization in the EU in 1998 a large number of entrants
started providing voice services through the incumbents' xed infrastructure. Third, in the late
1990s the deployment of internet broadband services started, which initially also mainly relied
on xed-line copper networks.
With the deployment of these new technologies the number of communication options in-
creased. This inuenced the way in which people communicate, in particular how they use
copper-based xed-line connections. The rapid increase in the number of mobile users was par-
alleled with a decline in the number of xed-line subscribers. At the same time, the eect of
broadband deployment on the usage of xed-line connections is less obvious. Broadband internet
access was rst deployed using digital subscriber line technology (DSL). This relied on copper-
based networks and required consumers to maintain their xed-line connections. In most of the
EU countries, DSL is still a dominant broadband technology. But there are also countries, es-
pecially in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), where alternative broadband technologies, such
as cable, bre and mobile broadband, obtained signicant market shares.
In this paper we analyze the substitution between xed-line and mobile voice services, and
the role of several complementarities that may inuence this process. In particular, we ask
whether and how the incumbent xed-line operators managed to slow down xed-to-mobile
substitution, and whether they could leverage their position from xed to the mobile voice
services. Furthermore, we ask to what extent broadband internet slowed down xed-to-mobile
substitution. Addressing these questions is important since xed-to-mobile substitution aects
the nancial viability of the incumbent xed-line operators. It is therefore critical for both
the operators and industry regulators to understand the interdependencies between dierent
communication technologies. The question of xed-to-mobile substitution is also important
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because of the ongoing consolidation process in telecommunications markets. There is a growing
number of mergers between mobile operators which need to be scrutinized by the competition
authorities, and substitution between xed-line and mobile services should play an important
role in the market investigations.
To address these questions, we make use of a unique micro-level dataset of 160,363 households
from 27 EU countries during the period 2005-2011. We adapt the model of Gentzkow (2007) to
analyze the situation in which households may choose bundles of dierent technologies: xed
voice or mobile voice only, or the combination of both services, with or without broadband
internet. We can summarize our results in three main ndings.
Our rst main nding is that households tend to perceive mobile and xed-line connections
as substitutes, and more strongly so in the recent years. In 2006 total xed-line penetration in
the EU was almost 67%, and it would have been 5.9% points higher if mobile voice had not been
present. At the end of 2011 total xed-line penetration was about 63%, and it would have been
almost 14.1% points higher without mobile voice access. At the same time, there is substantial
heterogeneity across households and regions. In regions with a higher GDP per capita mobile
and xed-line services tend to be stronger substitutes. After controlling for GDP per capita,
there is also a stronger degree of substitution in the CEE countries, as compared to the WE
countries. There is not only heterogeneity in xed-to-mobile substitution across regions, but
also across households with dierent age, education, professional activity, etc. This implies that
even within a region, some households may perceive xed-line and mobile connections as very
strong substitutes, whereas other households perceive them as essentially independent. Our
nding of strong heterogeneity in the perceived substitutability between xed-line and mobile
voice services provides an explanation for the mixed results found in the previous literature that
uses aggregate data.1
1For instance, Gruber and Verboven (2001) estimate a logistic diusion model for mobile subscriptions in the
EU and nd that the penetration rate of xed telephony has a negative inuence on the diusion of mobiles.
On the other hand, Gruber (2001) uses a similar approach for the Central and Eastern European countries and
suggests that mobile and xed-line services may be complements. In another paper, Hamilton (2003) uses data
for African countries nds that mobile and xed-line subscriptions may be both complements and substitutes at
dierent stages of market development. In the early stage of diusion, mobile services may complement xed-line
telephones but the substitution eect takes over once mobile usage becomes more widespread.
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Our second main nding relates to the role of the incumbents, i.e., the previous xed-line
monopolists, in slowing down the extent of xed-to-mobile substitution. To investigate this,
we extend our base model and estimate it using data for the years 2005 and 2006. For these
years, we observe whether households have xed and/or mobile voice at the incumbent or at a
competitor. This enables us to consider the simultaneous choice of xed and mobile voice, at
the incumbent or a competitor. We conrm the presence of xed-to-mobile substitution in this
model. Furthermore, we nd that the decline in xed-line penetration has been slowed down
because of various complementarities: bundled contracts and especially incumbency advantages
when xed-line incumbents are also active in mobile telephony. These incumbency advantages
increased the incumbent's market share by about 2.7% points in xed telephony and by up
to 5.4% points in mobile telephony at the end of 2006. Incumbents could thus not only slow
down the xed-to-mobile substitution process, but also leverage their strong position in xed
telephony into the mobile telephony market. These complementarities do not hurt, but actually
benet total xed and mobile penetration.
Our third main nding relates to the impact of broadband internet on xed-to-mobile substi-
tution. To assess this, we further extended the model to consider the simultaneous choice of xed
versus mobile voice services and the choice of broadband technology (no broadband, dial-up,
DSL, cable, mobile broadband and other). Also in this model specication we conrm the pres-
ence of signicant xed-to-mobile substitution, especially in the recent years. In addition, we
nd that the introduction of mobile broadband slightly strengthens this substitution. But more
importantly, broadband internet (mainly DSL) has been a strong source of complementarity
with xed-line telephony. Hence, the decline of xed telephony has been slowed down because of
the complementarity between the xed network and broadband internet. In particular, without
DSL xed-line voice penetration would have been about 6.3% lower at the end of 2006, and al-
most 8.7% points lower at the end of 2011. Most of these complementarities arise from bundling
xed-line and broadband in a single contract (enabling price discounts and convenience). These
ndings show that the xed-line incumbent has not only been able to leverage its advantage to
mobile voice services, but more importantly also to broadband.
There is a growing body of literature on substitution between xed-line and mobile services,
as reviewed in the next section. However, none of this work systematically analyzes this sub-
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stitution with detailed household-level data to account for heterogeneity in substitution across
households and regions. Furthermore, no work has investigated how complementarities have
slowed down xed-to-mobile substitution, through incumbency advantages and synergies with
xed broadband.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature.
Section 3 discusses the data used in the estimation. Section 4 introduces the econometric
framework. Section 5 presents the estimation results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
There is a growing body of literature on substitution between xed-line and mobile services,
which was recently reviewed in Vogelsang (2010). Most of these studies use cross-country or
country-level aggregate data and nd substitution between xed-line and mobile telecommuni-
cations services (see Gruber and Verboven (2001), Ward and Zheng (2012), Grzybowski (2014)).
A number of other studies rely on consumer-level data. Rodini et al. (2003) estimate the
substitutability between xed-line and mobile access using data on U.S. households and binary
logit model. They nd that second xed line and mobile services are substitutes for one another.
In another paper, Ward and Woroch (2010) use quarterly survey panel data in the U.S. for years
1999-2001 and a dierence-in-dierence analysis to estimate own- and cross-price elasticities of
demand for xed and mobile services, and they nd moderate substitution between these two.
Garca-Marinoso and Suarez (2013) use Spanish household panel data for the years 2004-2009
to analyze substitution from xed to mobile services. They nd that apart from household
characteristics also the availability of internet and mobile services plays a role, while prices and
expenditures have no, or a small, impact on the substitution decision.
Among papers which focus on internet access, Cardona et al. (2009) use household survey
data for Austria to estimate discrete choice models and nd that cable modem and mobile
access are close substitutes to DSL and that they are in the same market as DSL. Srinuan et al.
(2012) use discrete choice model on survey data for Sweden and nd that mobile broadband and
xed broadband technologies are close substitutes when they are locally available. Grzybowski
et al (2013) estimate a mixed logit model using survey data for Slovakia and nd that mobile
broadband should be included in the relevant market for internet access based on xed broadband
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technologies. However, none of these studies relate internet access to the demand of xed or
mobile connections in voice services.
The studies mentioned above which use discrete choice framework essentially assume some
degree of substitution between telecommunications technologies. There are only two recent
studies, Liu et al. (2010) and Macher et al. (2011), which explicitly model the possibility of
substitution or complementarity between telecommunications technologies in a discrete choice
framework. In the rst paper, Liu et al. (2010) use a panel survey data of U.S. households
for years 2004-2006 to estimate a discrete choice model for broadband services. Their model
allows also for parallel choices of related services such as cable TV and local phone and for
state-dependence in provider choices. They nd evidence of strong complementarities between
the consumption of broadband, cable TV and local phone services, where the main source of
complementarities are the benets derived by consumers from having a single provider for mul-
tiple services. In the second paper, Macher et al. (2012) estimate a bivariate probit model using
U.S. household data for years 2003-2010 to analyze whether xed-line and mobile connections
are substitutes or complements. Using the estimates of cross-price eects they conclude that
mobile and xed-line connections are substitutes rather than complements.
Our approach follows Gentzkow (2007) but in addition we also consider heterogeneity in
substitution across households and across the many geographic regions within the 27 EU coun-
tries.2 This allow us to conclude whether xed-line and mobile connections are substitutes,
complements or independent from each other in a particular country. We then comment on
the hypothesis that consumers across the EU dier in the perception of xed-line and mobile
services and to what extent this is driven by population characteristics. We also analyze whether
there is any incumbency advantages in oering to consumers both xed-line and mobile services
and to what extent the use of internet technologies inuences substitution or complementarity
between mobile and xed-line connections.
2Gentzkow (2007) also reports estimating a model specication in which the substitution parameter   varies
with observable consumer characteristics.
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3 Data
Survey data We use six Special Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 27 EU countries by
the TNS Opinion & Social Network on behalf of the European Commission. The surveys were
conducted in intervals of approximately 12 months between December 2005 and December 2011,
with the exception of the year 2008.3 The purpose of the surveys is to follow trends in electronic
communications markets and to assess how EU households and citizens derive benets from
increasingly competitive and innovative digital environment.4 A description of the sampling
methodology and a summary of the results for questions related to telecommunications services
can be found in the Eurobarometer reports published on the website of the Commission. The
survey should be representative on a country level. The Commission is granting access to
Eurobarometer primary data for re-use in social science research and training. We have processed
and combined these six surveys and selected variables which are relevant for our questions of
interest. Table 1 provides a list of variables which we use in the estimation. Table B.1 in the
Appendix shows the number of observations used in the analysis for each country. Tables B.2,
B.3 and B.4 in the Appendix illustrate trends in the data with respect to the usage of xed-line
and mobile connections.
Prices Data on prices of mobile and xed-line telecommunications services comes from the
reports on \Telecoms Price Developments" produced on annual basis by the consultancy rm
3There are two 2011 surveys. The rst one was conducted in February-March 2011 and the second one was
conducted in December 2011. The results of the rst survey should not be much dierent if it was conducted
at the end of 2010 instead. We consider therefore that it is equivalent to 2010 survey for consistency with other
surveys which were conducted at the end of each year.
4The surveys used in the analysis are: (i) Eurobarometer 64.4: Mental Well-Being, Telecommunications,
Harmful internet Content, and Farm Animal Welfare, December 2005 - January 2006; (ii) Eurobarometer 66.3:
Social Reality, E-Communications, Commin Agricultural Policy, Discrimination and the Media, and Medical
Research, November - December 2006; (iii) Eurobarometer 68.2: European Union Policy and Decision Making,
Corruption, Civil Justice, E-Communications, Agriculture, and Environmental Protection, November - December
2007; (iv) Eurobarometer 72.5: E-Communications, Agriculture, Geographical and Labor Market Mobility, and
Knowledge of Antibiotic Use, November-December 2009; (v) Eurobarometer 75.1: Energy in the European Union,
Citizens' Rights, E-Communications, the Internal Market, and Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage, February-
March 2011; (vi) Special Eurobarometer 381: E-communications Household Survey, December 2011.
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Teligen on behalf of the European Commission's Directorate General for Information Society.
The objective of these reports is to analyze price developments in the Member States of the
European Union in years 1998-2010. The reports show prices as of 1st August each year from
1998 to 2004, as of 1st September from 2005 to 2007, and as of 15th September from 2008
to 2010. Teligen collected tari data directly from the websites and price-lists of telecoms
operators. According to Teligen taris data were validated by the NRAs to ensure the reliability
of information. We miss Eurobarometer data for year 2008 because the survey was not conducted
in this year.5 There is no pricing data available for 2011, for which we have the last wave of the
survey. We therefore assume that prices were the same in 2010 and 2011.6
Prices used in this study are so called OECD composite baskets for xed-line and mobile
services. Due to changes in the usage patterns over time the denitions of the OECD baskets
were updated in the following years: 2002, 2006 and 2010. The price indices used in this paper
are based the 2002 OECD basket denition. There are three usage proles considered when
constructing price indices for mobile services: low, medium and high. In the paper we use low
usage prole which is constructed using 30 text messages and 25 outgoing calls (37 minutes) per
month, where 42% of calls are to xed line phones and 58% to mobile phones. Mobile baskets
are reported for the representative taris from two network operators with the greatest number
of subscribers in each country. Price indices for xed-line services are based on the 2000 OECD
basket denition including per month 100 national calls, 6 international calls and 10 calls to
mobile numbers. Fixed charges are also included in the basket with the appropriate annual
rental charge, and with the installation charge depreciated over 5 years. The distribution and
duration of calls is detailed in Teligen's reports, which are publicly available on the website of the
5We have combined the Teligen pricing data with the Eurobarometer survey data. Teligen data for years
2005-2010 was collected in September, which is a few months earlier than the Eurobarometer data, which was
usually collected at the end of the year. We assume that Eurobarometer data with eldwork in: December
2005 { January 2006 relates to 2005 Teligen data; November-December 2006 relates to 2006; November 2007 {
January 2008 relates to 2007; November-December 2009 relates to 2009; February-March 2011 relates to 2010 and
December 2011 also relates to 2010 due to lack of 2011 price information.
6The prices for mobile services in years 2005-2010 decreased on average by 33% with large dierences across
countries. The average change in prices between 2009 and 2010 is 0%. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume
that price in 2011 remained the same as in 2010. Using prices imputed in a dierent way should have only a
marginal impact on the estimates.
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European Commission. For xed-line services, Teligen provides only baskets for the incumbent
operator in each country. There is no pricing information available for broadband services. We
explain how prices are constructed for each estimation when introducing the models.
Regional data We lack individual-level information on income, which is approximated using
regional GDP per capita statistics from Eurostat on so called NUTS 2 level. NUTS is a geocode
standard for referencing the administrative divisions of the EU countries for statistical purposes.
There are three NUTS levels. We use data at the NUTS 2 level, which refers to basic regions with
population ranging between 800 thousands and 3 million inhabitants.7 There are 273 NUTS 2
regions in 27 EU countries used in the analysis. The survey includes information on the NUTS
2 region in which households live that is combined with Eurostat statistics. We also use NUTS
2 level information to dene regional availability of broadband technologies as discussed below.
4 Econometric Model
We model the households' decisions whether to use xed-line and/or voice mobile telephone
services, and, in an extension, the use of voice services in combination with the decision to use
a particular internet technology. A standard discrete choice framework is not suitable for such
analysis because households may simultaneously choose more than one alternative: (i) they may
use both xed and mobile voice services, and (ii) these services can be combined with a certain
internet technology. To incorporate the possibility that households may choose multiple options,
we follow the approach of Gentzkow (2007) and formulate a discrete choice model for bundles of
alternatives. His model is designed to handle bivariate choice such as decision problem (i) and
may not extend to a greater number of choice alternatives, as in the case of (ii). Nevertheless,
as discussed in Section 5 below, both models lead to analogous conclusion with respect to the
substitution between xed-line and mobile connections.
We rst present the base model, where households choose only between voice services (section
4.1), and then extend the model to incorporate the simultaneous choice of internet technology
(section 4.2).
7Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction
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4.1 Demand for voice services
Base model A household i has available two possible voice services, indexed by j: xed-line
(j = F ) and mobile (j = M). The choice set consists of the four possible bundles of these
services, r 2 f0; F;M;F +Mg, where r = 0 refers to the choice of no telephone at all, and
r = F +M refers to the choice of both xed and mobile services. Figure 1 shows the shares of
these four choice alternatives across 27 EU countries in March 2011. Table 2 summarizes these
shares for all the countries, showing that the majority of households in the sample have both a
xed and a mobile voice connection, many households either have a xed or a mobile voice line,
while the minority has no voice connection at all.
Household i's stand-alone utility from a connection to voice service j is:
uij = xij + pij ;
where pij is the price paid by individual i for voice service j and xi is a vector of household
characteristics inuencing the utility of the voice service. The price pij refers to the xed sub-
scription charge plus the usage cost of a representative consumer. For the price of xed-line
we use the cost of usage basket of the incumbent's tari, and for the price of mobile we use an
average of the costs of two usage baskets: one for incumbent's tari and one for a tari of the
main competitor in terms of market shares. Fixed-line prices are the same for all households
on the country-level varying over time. Mobile prices are also the same on the country-level
varying over time, but they dier across households depending on whether they declared using
a prepaid or post-paid tari. The vector of household characteristics xi consists of three groups
of variables: household demographics (such as sex, age, education, household size); employment
status (such as student, retired or employment sector); and regional and time information (such
as country, regional GDP per capita, time eects).
A household's utility for a bundle of voice services r 2 f0; F;M;F +Mg is:
uir = "ir if r = 0
uir =
X
j2r
uij +  ir + "ir; if r 6= 0 (1)
where j 2 r denotes the set of products indexed by j which are included in bundle r. The
term  ir is the dierence between the household's total utility for the bundle r and the sum
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of the stand-alone utilities uij for the services j 2 r. For the singleton bundles, r = F and
r = M , we set  ir = 0. For the real bundle r = F +M , the services are complements if  ir > 0,
substitutes if  ir < 0, and independent if  ir = 0. Gentzkow (2007) provides a discussion how
price aects the marginal consumers in these three situations. We specify  ir = xi, which
allows for household heterogeneity in their valuation of the substitutability or complementarity
of xed and mobile services. The heterogeneity depends on the same household characteristics
that aect the stand-alone utilities for xed and mobile voice (demographics, employment status
and regional and time information). The terms "ir are i.i.d. type I extreme value distributed,
i.e., the typical \logit" error terms.
Based on this specication, we obtain the following utilities for the four bundles
ui0 = "i0
uiF = xiF + piF + "iF
uiM = xiM + piM + "iM
uiF+M = xi (F + M + ) +  (piF + piM ) + "iF+M :
Note that we only observe prices for the unbundled voice services, piF and piM , and dene
the price of a bundled service as piF+M = piF + piM . If a household adopts both xed and
mobile from a dierent operator, as long as usage remains unchanged, this sum is an accurate
description of the cost.8 If, however, a household has a contract bundle for xed and mobile
voice from the same operator, then the household may pay a lower price because of a discount
or receive some other contractual benets. To account for this \contractual complementarity",
we make use of information in the survey and construct a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
household has a contract bundle for xed and mobile voice from the same operator, and 0 if
it adopts xed and mobile voice from a dierent operator. Our estimate of the parameter 
may then be viewed as the extent of substitution/complementarity between xed and mobile
net of the contractual complementarity that arises from the fact that a household makes use of
a bundled contract.
Incumbent versus competitor We can easily extend this framework to distinguish between
the type of operator providing the voice service: incumbent or competitor. Due to lack of
8The usage of xed-line and mobile telephones may obviously change when both services are used together.
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detailed data all non-incumbent operators are denoted as competitor. The index j now refers to
voice service and operator type: incumbent xed-line (j = F1), competitor xed-line (j = F2),
incumbent mobile (j = M1), competitor mobile (j = M2). The choice set then consists of nine
possible bundles r 2 f0; F1; F2;M1;M2; F1 +M1; F1 +M2; F2 +M1; F2 +M2g. The utilities for
the stand-alone alternatives j and for the bundles r take the same form as before. Since there
is a large number of bundles we will impose restrictions on the number of interaction terms, as
explained in the section discussing estimation results.
The information on the name of operator used by the household is only available for 2005
and 2006, so we limit this analysis to these rst two years of the survey. Table 3 shows that
most households have a xed-line connection from the incumbent, and among these households
roughly equal numbers have a mobile connection from the incumbent and from a competitor.
The number of households with a xed-line connection from a competitor is smaller and in some
countries xed-line services are provided exclusively by the incumbent. In the UK, on the other
hand, the incumbent does not operate mobile services at all.
Due to limited price information we have to make the following assumptions. For xed-line
we only have the cost of usage basket for a representative tari of the incumbent operator. We
assume therefore that competitors' xed-line prices are exactly the same as of the incumbent.
For mobile services we have the cost of usage basket for a representative tari of the incumbent
and of the main competitor in terms of market share. We assume that mobile prices are the
same of all the non-incumbent operators. Hence, as in our base model xed-line prices are
the same for all households on the country-level varying over time. Mobile prices are also on
the country-level varying over time but dier between incumbent and competitor and across
households depending on whether they declared using prepaid or post-paid tari.
4.2 Demand for voice services and internet technology
We now extend the framework to incorporate the households' choice of internet technology. Each
household has available two voice services j = fF;Mg (as in the base model) and six possible
internet technology choices: (i) no internet, (ii) copper-based dial-up, or \narrowband"; (iii)
copper-based DSL broadband; (iv) cable modem broadband; (v) mobile broadband; and (vi)
other broadband (usually bre or WiFi). We denote these internet options by k = 0; 1;    ; 5.
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Therefore, the households' choice set consists of a maximum of 24 possible bundles of services:
the 4 voice bundles f0; F;M;F +Mg times the 6 internet choices. In practice, however, there
are almost no households without a voice service who have an internet connection via any of
the 5 technologies, as shown in Table 4. We therefore restrict the choice set to the remaining
19 alternatives and drop from the analysis the small number of households who selected any of
these 5 alternatives which are not considered as viable in our analysis. Note that in principle
households may choose more than one internet technology. However, as shown in Table 5, the
incidence of having more than one internet technology is rare, and we remove these households
from the analysis. In most of these cases, people have both xed and mobile broadband.
A household's stand-alone utility for voice service j is the same as specied earlier in (1).
The additional utility from combining xed and mobile technology, r = F +M , is also specied
earlier as  ir = xi, where: if  ir > 0 xed and mobile are complements; they are substitutes if
 ir < 0; and they are independent if  ir = 0. The stand-alone utility for an internet technology
k is not identied because in the sample households always combine internet with at least one
voice service. The household's valuation of a specic internet technology k may depend on the
type of voice service j 2 fF;Mg, reecting substitution or complementarity between a particular
voice services and internet. For example, households may keep a copper xed-line connection for
voice because it may also be used to access internet via dial-up or DSL. Conversely, households
may give up their xed-line connection for voice services when they access internet via a cable
modem, a mobile modem or bre.9 To model this, we let ij;k to represent the additional
utility from adopting internet technology k when the household has adopted the voice service
j 2 fF;Mg. We specify ij;k = j;k + xik. The rst term j;k is a xed eect capturing the
valuations for combining the voice service j with the various internet technologies k. The second
term captures the eects of household characteristics on the valuation of internet connection
k. For example, iF;1 is the additional utility from adopting copper-based dial-up (k = 1)
when the household has a xed-line. To simplify, we assume that k is the same for all internet
connections k > 0 and denote k = I for k > 0. Hence, I captures households' valuations for
9Grzybowski (2013) uses the aggregate data from the Eurobarometer reports published by the European
Commission to analyze xed-to-mobile substitution. He reports that the share of `xed + mobile' households
is positively correlated with percentage of households having internet access and negatively correlated with the
share of households having cable modem.
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any internet connection. The intercepts j;k are still internet technology-specic.
A household's utility for a voice service r 2 f0; F;M;F +Mg in combination with an internet
technology k can then be specied as:
uir;k = "ir;k if r = 0; k = 0
uir;k =
X
j2r
uij +  ir +ij;k + "ir;k if r 6= 0;
where the terms "ir;k are again the logit error terms.
This gives the following utilities
ui0;0 = "i0;0
uiF;k = xi (F + I) + F;k + piF + "iF;k
uiM;k = xi (M + I) + M;k + piM + "iM;k
uiF+M;k = xi (F + M +  + I) + (F;k + M;k) +  (piF + piM ) + "iF+M;k:
4.3 Choice Probabilities and Estimation
In the rst model households choose the voice bundle r and in the second model they simulta-
neously choose the voice bundle r and internet technology k that maximizes random utility. We
focus here on the second model which is more general. Given that the "ir;k are type I extreme
value distributed, random utility maximization results in the following logit choice probabilities:
sir;k =
exp (Vir;k)
1 +
P
k
P
r exp (Vir;k)
(2)
where Vir;k  uir;k  "ir;k is the deterministic component of household i's utility for voice bundle
r and internet technology k.10
Both in the rst model (voice bundles only) and in the second model (voice bundles +
internet), we take into account the geographic availability of the choice alternatives. First, while
mobile voice services are universally available in all the EU countries, xed voice services may
not always be available in rural areas, especially in the CEE countries. As a sensitivity check,
we estimate the models on a sub-sample of households living in large towns and cities, where
10We can also consider an alternative model specication, in which consumers choose between prepaid and
postpaid mobile services. However, such analysis would be limited to years 2008, 2010 and 2011 only, for which
we have prices for both prepaid and postpaid.
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xed-line connection should be in general available. The estimation results are broadly similar.
Hence, we estimate the nal model assuming that xed-line is available to all households in each
country.
Second, certain types of broadband internet technologies may not be available in certain
geographic areas or even in the whole country. In the second model, we therefore restrict the
choice sets to those broadband technologies which are available in the region where the household
resides, where the residence information is specied by NUTS 2 area, which is explained in
Section 3. We construct the choice set of broadband technologies as follows. If there is at least
one household in the survey which uses a particular broadband technology in a given NUTS 2
area, we assume that it is also available to all other households in this area. This assumption
still makes the choice set potentially too broad, because the fact that there are households using
a particular broadband technology in a given geographic area does not imply that it is available
to all other households in this area.
The choice probabilities (with suitably modied summations in the numerator of (2) to
account for limited geographic availability of broadband) form the basis of the likelihood function
which is taken to the data. Dening yir;k = 1 if household i selects voice bundle r and internet
technology k, and yij;k = 0 otherwise, the log likelihood function can be written as:
L() =
NX
i
X
r;k
yir;k log sir;k () : (3)
where  is the vector of all parameters to be estimated. The maximum likelihood estimator is
the value of the parameter vector  that maximizes (3). The model allows for rich substitution
patterns because of a large set of included observed household characteristics.
We have estimated a model in which we allow for the correlation between bivariate choices
due to unobserved preferences as in Gentzkow (2007), using a random coecients model. The
results indicate that to a large extent we are able to control for the correlation of xed-line
and mobile choices by means of observable individual characteristics. While the unobserved
correlation parameter is signicant in the model without individual characteristics, it becomes
insignicant in the model with a detailed set of individual characteristics. We therefore focus
on the base model with only observed heterogeneity in the discussion of the estimation results
and counterfactual simulations. We present the derivation of the random coecients model and
16
the estimation results in Appendix.11
5 Empirical Results
In section 5.1 we present the empirical results for the two models where households only choose
between voice services (Tables 6 and 7). Section 5.2 then considers the results from the third
model, where households simultaneously choose the voice service and the internet technology,
if any (Table 9). In all three specications, we include a rich set of household characteristics.
Summary statistics for these household characteristics are shown earlier in Table 1.
5.1 Voice services
Table 6 shows the empirical results for the two models where households only choose between
the two voice services. The left part considers the base model, where the choice set is limited to 4
alternatives: f0; F;M;F +Mg, i.e. households may either choose no telephone, xed, mobile or
both. The right part considers the second model with an extended choice set of 9 alternatives,
f0; F1; F2;M1;M2; F1 + M1; F1 + M2; F2 + M1; F2 + M2g. As discussed above, in this model
households also decide whether to take xed or mobile services from the incumbent (xed-line)
operator (subscript 1), or from a competitor (subscript 2).
In both specications, price has a negative and highly signicant eect on utility.12 In
addition to the price parameter, Table 6 reports three columns: the rst and second columns
give the stand-alone utilities for xed-line and mobile voice services (F and M ), and the
third column shows the substitution or complementarity eects between xed and mobile ().
Table 6 presents only the main eects and the interactions with regional variables (regional
income per capita and a dummy variable for the group of CEE countries), while Table 7 shows
11Arora (1996) and Miravete and Pernias (2010) argue that it is not possible conclude on complementarity
(substitutability from the positive (negative) correlation in choices due to indirect eects. Even though these
papers consider models without prices, the same identication issue is likely to persist when, as in our paper,
xed-line and mobile prices are included in the estimation. We thank the referee for indicating this problem to
us.
12We have checked for the robustness of estimates with respect to the price index for mobile services which we
use in the estimation. We have re-estimated the model using an average price for low, medium and high usage
baskets instead of the low usage basket. The price coecient remains signicant and almost unchanged.
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the interactions with the household characteristics for the rst specication. The estimated
household interactions for the second model (and our subsequent third model with simultaneous
choice of broadband) are very similar, so we only present them in the Appendix.
We focus most of our discussion on the estimated substitution eects (parameter vector ),
but also briey comment on the stand-alone eects (F and M ).
Base model According to the left part of Table 6, households who live in richer regions are
more likely to have both mobile and xed-line connections (positive and strongly signicant
F and M ). We compute the marginal eect of income on the probability of having a xed-
line connection, which on average in the sample is 0.22. It is a bit higher than the average
marginal eect on the probability of having a mobile connection of 0.14. Hence, a 1% increase in
income increases xed-line connections by 0.22% and mobile connections by 0.14%. Furthermore,
households from the CEE countries are more likely to have mobile, but less likely to have xed-
line connections than households from the WE countries (after controlling for regional income
and other household characteristics). Finally, the adoption of mobile phones is still increasing
over time (during 2006-2011), whereas the adoption of xed-line services shows limited variation
across years.
Our main interest is in the parameter vector , which measures the extent of substitution
(or potentially complementarity) between xed and mobile voice. Notice rst that the intercept
in  is negative and highly signicant. This estimate implies that households on average tend to
view xed-line and mobile voice as substitutes. Furthermore, the extent of substitution became
considerably stronger in the more recent years 2009-2011, compared with the early years of our
study 2006-2008. To assess this further, we computed the average \xed-to-mobile" diversion
ratio implied by our base model estimates. This ratio is the reduction in xed-line households
relative to the increase in mobile households after a price drop for mobile voice services.13 The
average xed-to-mobile diversion ratio was 9.0% during 2006-2008, and it increased to 15.6%
during 2009-2011. This means that, in 2009-2011, a sizeable 15.6% of the (marginal) mobile
13Formally, this diversion ratio is
 P
k @(siF;k + siM+F;k)=@piM

=
 P
k @(siM;k + siM+F;k)=@piM

, which for
the base model specication without broadband yields ((siF +siM+F )(siM+siM+F ) siM+F )=((siM+siM+F )(1 
siM   siM+F )). We compute the diversion ratios from expression (2) using the parameter estimates for the base
model, and averaging the values over households.
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households would otherwise have chosen xed-line access.
We have also estimated the sample average own- and cross-price elasticities implied by our
base model estimates using Petrin-Train control function approach, for which the standard
logit formulas had to be adapted accordingly. The average own price elasticity for xed-line
connections -0.43 and for mobile is -0.21, as shown in Table 8. The average cross-price elasticities
are 0.021.14
One can also observe interesting dierences in substitution across regions. There is a stronger
substitution in the areas with a high regional income per capita and in the CEE countries
(negative and signicant eect in ). The stronger substitution in the CEE countries (after
controlling for regional income and dierences in household characteristics) may be due to the
lower quality of the xed network than in the WE countries.15 Furthermore, there is a substantial
heterogeneity across households in the perceived substitutability between xed-line and mobile
services, as shown in Table 7. For example, households who live in cities, males and highly
educated people are more likely to substitute to mobile, while large households and households
with many kids are less likely to substitute. Proprietors and travelling professions consider
xed-line and mobile as stronger substitutes, and households with non-working, housekeeping
members tend to view xed-line and mobile as complementary.16
14Our estimates are comparable to the price elasticities reported by the New Zealand Commerce Commission
(2003), which summarizes estimation results for international studies. For instance, price elasticities for mobile
subscription are reported to fall in the range between -0.06 and -0.54. In another paper, Doganoglu and Grzybowski
(2007) estimate a nested logit model and report price elasticities of demand for mobile subscriptions in Germany
ranging between -0.19 and -0.52.
15As mentioned earlier, the model was also estimated for a limited sample of households which live in towns and
cities to account for possible lack of availability of xed-line in rural areas, but the results were broadly similar.
In another specication, we considered a set of dummy variables for all the countries instead of the CEE dummy.
There are signicant dierences in the estimates of dummy variables across countries, with the greatest negative
values for the CEE countries. The remaining estimates are very similar.
16Table 7 shows the eects of household characteristics on the stand-alone utilities for xed-line and mobile
voice services (F and M ). City households have a higher valuation for both xed-line and mobile voice services
than households in smaller towns and rural areas. The same is true for married households, for larger households
with a small number of kids below age 15, and for more educated households. Males and younger households
also have a higher valuation for mobile phones, but they have a lower valuation for a xed-line connection. There
are also signicant dierences in the stand-alone valuations for mobile and xed-line across dierent professional
groups.
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Finally, it is interesting to consider the estimated coecient for the contract bundle variable.
This is signicant and positive, which means that consumers benet from contractual comple-
mentarities when they have a single contract for xed and mobile voice at the same operator.
Such complementarities may be present because of price discounts or because of convenience or
some other contractual advantages. We discuss this further in the next subsection, where we
distinguish between incumbents and competitors.
Incumbent versus competitor The right part of Table 6 shows the estimation results for
the second model with the expanded choice set, which makes a distinction between having a
xed-line or mobile connection from the incumbent or a competitor. This model uses data for
years 2005 and 2006, because information about the operator used by the households is available
for these years only. The impact of household characteristics is similar to the previous model
(shown in Table 7), so we only present these results in the Appendix. Substitution between
xed and mobile is weaker, which is mainly because we consider years 2005 and 2006.
Our new ndings relate to the role of the incumbency status. Not surprisingly, households
have a considerably higher valuation for a xed-line connection at the incumbent xed-line
operator (second column). This simply reects the fact that the incumbent operator is the
dominant provider of xed-line services and owns most of the xed telephony network, to which
competitors need to obtain access. Furthermore, households tend to have a lower valuation for
a mobile connection that is oered by the incumbent (rst column). This reects the fact that
most European countries have strongly promoted competition in the mobile telecommunications
market through the policy of granting licences to develop mobile networks. Even though the
incumbent was typically granted a mobile licence early on, the competitors altogether tend to
have greater market share than the incumbent.
Most interestingly, we can now distinguish between two sources of complementarity: contrac-
tual complementarity from having a single contract for xed and mobile at the same operator
(as before) and the complementarity between the incumbent's xed and mobile network (third
column). First, the contractual complementarity is still estimated to be positive and highly
signicant, but it is lower than in the base model. Second, the complementarity between the
incumbent's xed-line and mobile voice services is also highly signicant. In this sense, we can
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conclude that the incumbent xed-line operators have an intrinsic advantage in the mobile mar-
ket. They benet not only from the possibility of oering bundled contracts (as the entrants can
do as well), but also from additional advantages relative to entrants. The xed-line incumbents
which have a dominant position in xed telephony in almost all of the EU countries thus have
the possibility to leverage this position into the mobile telephony market.
To summarize, the results from the base model and its extension establish that xed-line
connections are in decline because of signicant substitution from xed to mobile telephony.
But the decline has been slowed down because of various complementarities: bundled contracts
and incumbency advantages when xed-line incumbents are also active in mobile telephony. To
quantify the importance of these ndings, we performed several policy counterfactuals to assess
the impact of the introduction of mobile voice services.
Counterfactuals: the impact of mobile on xed-line and mobile penetration Table
10 shows the impact of the mobile telephony on xed-line and mobile penetration in the EU.
For the year 2011 the estimated impact is based on the rst model (base model in left part of
Table 6). For the year 2006 the estimated impact is based on the second model (extended base
model in right part of Table 6), since for this year we observe whether a household has a voice
connection from the incumbent or a competitor.
The rst row in Table 10 shows the penetration rates of xed-line, mobile, xed-line plus
mobile and no voice adoption, as predicted by the model under the status quo in 2006 and 2011.17
The second row shows the impact of removing mobile voice services, implemented as a prohibitive
(or \innite") price increase for mobile voice.18 A comparison of both rows shows the following.
In 2006 mobile telephony reduced the xed-line penetration rate by 5.9% points (66.9%, versus
72.8% if mobile telephony had not existed). In 2011 the impact was even stronger: mobile
telephony reduced xed-line penetration by 14.1% points (63.1%, versus 77.3% without mobile
telephony). These numbers are consistent with our earlier reported xed-to-mobile diversion
ratios.19 While mobile telephony was detrimental for the xed-line network, it also implied a
17The predicted penetration rates are very close to the actual penetration rate, indicating a good model t.
18Removing mobile phones completely is not realistic but it can be used for comparison with the other coun-
terfactual scenarios.
19The xed-to-mobile diversion ratio is 7.7% in 2006 (=0.729-0.669)/0.78, and 15.6% in 2011 (=0.772-0.632)/0.9.
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much larger number of households with voice access. For example, only 2.4% of the households
have no telephony at the end of 2011, and this would have been 22.7% if there had not been
mobile telephony (mainly in poorer regions).
The third row shows a case in which prices of mobile services remain unchanged since 2005.
The purpose of this counterfactual simulation is to consider a potential impact of regulation
on xed-to-mobile substitution. In general, prices of mobile service tend to decrease over time,
which may be partly due to regulation of interconnection charges. For instance, as reported by
the Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications (BEREC), the average mobile
termination charges in the EU decreased from 12.81 cents in 2007 to 3.95 cents in 2012, which is
69%. The prices of mobile services which we use in this analysis decreased on average by 17% in
2006 and by 33% in 2011, as compared to 2005, but with a large variation in price changes across
countries. If we attribute the decline in prices of mobile services to regulation of interconnection
charges, this counterfactual simulation may be considered as an approximation of the impact
of regulation on the xed-to-mobile substitution. The third row indicates that there are only
marginal changes in mobile and xed-line penetration levels relative to the status quo. In 2006
mobile penetration would be 77.8% versus 77.9% in the status quo and in 2011 it would be
88.5% versus 89.9% in the status quo. Fixed-line penetration would remain unchanged in 2006
at 66.9% and would be marginally higher in 2011 at 63.3%, as compared to 63.1% in the status
quo. Hence, regulation of interconnection charges and corresponding decline in retail prices has
negligible impact on xed-to-mobile substitution.
The fourth row shows the impact of bundled contracts, implemented by assuming households
have no advantage from bundling mobile and xed-line services in a single contract (as we
estimated in Table 6). In 2006 contractual bundling increased the xed-line network by 0.5%
points (from 66.4% to 66.9%). In 2011, the impact of bundling increased the xed-line network
by 1.2% (from 61.9% to 63.1%), which is due to greater use of bundling practices.
Finally, the fth row shows the impact of the incumbent's advantage when it oers both
xed and mobile telephony, as has been allowed by regulators in most European countries. The
possibility for the incumbent xed operators to oer mobile had a positive impact on xed-
They are of same order of magnitude as reported above, but not entirely comparable. Here, we consider a
prohibitive price increase, the total eect (rather than the average), and for 2006 a dierent model specication.
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line penetration of 1.9% point (from 65.0% to 66.9%). Furthermore, it also increases mobile
penetration by 1% point (from 76.9% to 77.9%). We also consider the impact of allowing
the xed incumbents to oer mobile on their market shares. The xed incumbent obtains an
additional 2.7% market share in xed telephony when regulators allow it to also oer mobile
(57.5%-54.8%). And it obtains an additional 5.4% market share in mobile telephony (38.1%-
32.7%), as compared to a mobile competitor that would not operate a xed network.
In sum, the xed-line operators thus benet from two incumbency advantages when allowed
to oer mobile: they protect their xed-line market share, and can also leverage it in mobile
telephony. Furthermore, these incumbency advantages do not hurt, but actually promote total
xed and mobile penetration.
5.2 Voice services and internet technology
Table 9 shows the empirical results for the third model, which considers the simultaneous choice
of voice and internet technology. As discussed in Section 4, there are now 19 choice alternatives:
the 4 voice bundles f0; F;M;F +Mg, which may be combined with at most 6 possible internet
choices (including no internet). In addition to the stand-alone utilities for voice (F and M ) and
substitution/complementarity eects between xed and mobile (), we now also estimate how
household characteristics inuence internet adoption (I), and the substitution/complementary
between xed and mobile voice and the various internet technologies (j;k). The estimates for the
stand-alone utilities and substitution eects for voice services (F , M and ) are comparable
to our base model: mobile and xed-line voice services are perceived as substitutes, and this is
more so in the CEE countries than in the WE countries.
Our new ndings relate to the substitution/complementarity eects between voice services
and internet (j;k). Based on Table 9, this can be summarized as follows. On the one hand,
all ve broadband technologies are complementary with a mobile voice connection, but the
complementarity is strongest for the mobile broadband technology. On the other hand, DSL
and dial-up are the only broadband technologies that show a strong complementarity with a
xed-line connection. Cable and other broadband show only very weak or no complementarity
with a xed-line connection, whereas mobile broadband is in fact a strong substitute for a xed
line connection. This follows from the fact that DSL and dial-up require households to have
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a copper line connection, so that they can obtain xed-line voice services at small or no costs.
In contrast, mobile broadband does not require a copper line connection, so that they become
substitutes.
It is also interesting to note the complementarity which is generated from bundled contracts.
As already found in the base model, a contract that bundles xed and mobile voice generates
complementarities (in the form of price discounts or convenience). Furthermore, there is an even
stronger complementarity from contracts that bundle xed voice with broadband internet (dial-
up or DSL). There is also some complementarity from bundling mobile voice with internet, but
much weaker than for xed voice.
Note that our model also includes interactions of household characteristics with internet
access (I). These results are shown in the Appendix, and we briey review them here. First,
households living in the cities and smaller towns are more likely to use internet, as compared
to households from rural areas. Males and married households are more likely to have internet
access. The same is true for larger households, households with many kids, younger and highly
educated households.
To summarize, the results from the third model conrm the presence of signicant substi-
tution from xed to mobile telephony. Furthermore, we nd that the decline of xed telephony
has been slowed down because of the complementarity of the xed network with dierent broad-
band technologies and the associated bundled contracts. As in the previous subsection, we now
quantify the importance of these ndings through several policy counterfactuals. We focus only
on the impact of the introduction of internet.20
Counterfactuals: the impact of internet on xed-line and mobile penetration Table
11 shows the impact of internet on xed-line and mobile voice penetration in the EU. This is
based on our third model `base model + broadband' (for which the parameter estimates are
reported in Table 9). The rst row shows the predicted penetration rates under the status quo.
These are close to the numbers in Table 10.
The second row shows the estimated impact of entirely removing internet. A comparison of
20The counterfactuals for the impact of mobile voice on xed voice give similar results as in the two models in
the previous section, so we do not report these here.
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the rst and second row shows the following. Without the introduction of internet, xed-line
voice penetration would have been 7.1% points lower in 2006 (69.1% { 61.9%), and even 9.8%
points lower in 2011 (63.0% { 53.2%). The complementarity with internet has thus been a main
driver for slowing down the process of xed-to-mobile substitution.
The third row of Table 11 shows how much of the broadband internet eect can be attributed
to DSL, which is the main broadband technology in the EU requiring copper xed-line connec-
tion.21 Without the DSL internet technology, xed-line voice penetration would have been 6.3%
points lower in 2006, and 8.7% points lower in 2011. Hence, most of the positive impact of
internet on the xed line network can be attributed to the complementarity with DSL.
Finally, the fourth row shows the impact of the contractual bundling practices on the xed
and mobile telephony networks. If xed-line and internet were not oered as bundles, then
xed-line penetration would be up to 9.8% lower at the end of 2011. Hence, the positive eect
of internet on the xed line network can be entirely attributed to the bundling practices. This
can be in the form of price discounts or convenience from having a single provider for voice and
internet.
The discussion focused so far on the large positive impact of internet on the xed-line net-
work. The impact of internet on the mobile network has also been positive but not surprisingly
much smaller in magnitude. For example, without internet, mobile voice penetration in 2006
would have been 3.2% points lower (79.0% { 75.8%).
Tables 10 and 11 report predictions for the EU countries altogether, but there are signicant
dierences across countries in how xed-line penetration changes in these dierent scenarios.
This is largely due to dierences in substitution between xed-line and mobile services and
dierences in the penetration of internet technologies.
The cross-country dierences in xed-to-mobile substitution may be also due to regulation.
For instance, there are dierences across countries with respect to the number of operators,
presence of MVNOs, infrastructure sharing policies, regulation of termination rates, etc.22 These
regulations may inuence the level of prices and through this the xed-to-mobile substitution
21Dial-up internet (or narrowband) also requires the copper xed-line network, but it is quickly losing popularity.
In our counterfactual we remove both DSL and dial-up.
22Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) is a service provider which does not own the wireless network
infrastructure over which it provides services to its customers.
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(see Grzybowski (2005) for an analysis of the impact of regulation on prices of mobile services in
the EU). In this paper we focus on demand side analysis and therefore cannot make a connection
between regulation and xed-to-mobile substitution.23
6 Conclusion
In this paper we use a rich survey data of 160,363 households from 27 EU countries in the years
2005-2011 to analyze substitution between access to xed-line and mobile telecommunications
services, and the role of complementarities that may inuence this process. We estimate discrete
choice models in which households can choose between access to xed-line and/or mobile voice
services, possibly in combination with broadband.
We consider three model specications. In the rst model specication, households only
choose between voice services where the choice set consists of 4 alternatives: no telephone,
xed, mobile or both. In the second specication, households choose between voice services
from the xed-line incumbent operator or from competitors, so that the choice set is extended
to 9 alternatives. In the third model specication, households simultaneously choose voice and
internet technology. There are 19 choice alternatives in this case: the 4 choices of voice from the
rst specication, which may be combined with at most 6 internet technology choices (including
having no internet).
The results from the rst and second model specication show that xed-line connections
are in decline because of signicant substitution from xed to mobile telephony: in 2011 mobile
telephony reduced xed-line penetration by 14.1% points. The degree of substitution is not
homogeneous: it varies between households and it is stronger in regions with a high income per
capita and in the CEE countries (which may be due to the lower quality of the xed network than
in the WE countries). We also nd that the decline has been slowed down because of various
complementarities: bundled contracts and incumbency advantages when xed-line incumbents
are also active in mobile telephony. These incumbency advantages increased the incumbent's
23The variation in prices over time and across countries may be driven by reductions in termination rates.
Bourreau et al. (2014) analyze the impact of varying levels of termination rates on consumer subscription decisions
to xed-line and mobile services. Based on numerical simulations they nd that each (xed or mobile) termination
rate has a positive eect on the take-up of the corresponding service, via the well-known waterbed eect.
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market share by about 2.7% points in xed telephony, and by up to 5.4% points in mobile
telephony at the end of 2006. Incumbents could thus not only slow down the xed-to-mobile
substitution process, but also leverage their strong position in xed telephony into the mobile
telephony market. These complementarities did not hurt, but actually beneted total xed and
mobile penetration.
The results from the third model conrm the presence of signicant substitution from xed
to mobile telephony. Furthermore, we nd that the decline of xed telephony has been slowed
down because of the complementarity of the xed network with Internet. In particular, without
the introduction of DSL, xed-line voice penetration would have been 8.7% points lower at the
end of 2011. Most of these complementarities arise from the fact that xed-line and broadband
are oered in a bundled contract (enabling price discounts and increased convenience). These
ndings show that the xed-line incumbent operator has not only been able to leverage its
advantage to mobile voice services, but more importantly also to broadband, since the incumbent
typically owns the xed copper network infrastructure.
Our results suggest that policies towards regulation of broadband market have an impact
on the market structure of voice services. We can in general distinguish between two regulatory
approaches which result in dierent market structures of broadband services. One approach
is to promote competition on the incumbent's copper network through regulation which pro-
vides entrants with access to incumbent's infrastructure via local loop unbundling (service-based
competition).24 Another approach is to promote deployment and competition between dierent
broadband platforms such as cable modem, bre, WiFi and more recently mobile broadband
(infrastructure-based competition). Some countries opted for service-based competition resulting
in high market share of DSL connections, while other pursued infrastructure-based competition
with a high market share of other broadband technologies. Due to complementarities with voice
services these internet policies led to a dierent level of penetration of xed-line and mobile
connections.
24Local loop unbundling is the regulatory process of allowing multiple telecommunications operators to use
connections from the telephone exchange to the customer's premises.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Shares of voice technologies across the EU countries
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Appendix A
In this Appendix we describe the model with unobserved heterogeneity for xed and mobile
alternatives. The utilities for the four bundles r 2 f0; F;M;F +Mg are given by:
ui0 = i0
uiF = iF + xiF + piF + iF
uiM = iM + xiM + piM + iM
uiF+M = (iF + iM ) + xi(F + M + ) + (piF + piM ) + iF+M
Unobserved preferences for xed-line and mobile access j = F;M are denoted by the random
coecients vector i = (iF ; iM ), which is assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution
with the following mean and covariance matrix:0@ iF
iM
1A 
0@ F
M
1A ;
0@ 2F FM
FM 
2
M
1A :
Because the sum of two normal variables is also a normal variable, the vector i = (iF ; iM ; iF+
iM ) has a trivariate normal distribution with mean  and covariance matrix :0BBBB@
iF
iM
iF + iM
1CCCCA 
0BBBB@
F
M
F + M
1CCCCA ;
0BBBB@
2F FM 
2
F + FM
FM 
2
M 
2
M + FM
2F + FM 
2
M + FM 
2
F + 
2
M + 2FM
1CCCCA :
Hence, we have a special case of a general mixed logit with trivariate normal distribution, where
we impose restrictions on the mean and covariance elements relating to the third option. We
can use the Cholesky decomposition  = RR0, where R is a lower triangular matrix,
R =
0BBBB@
r1 0 0
r3 r2 0
r1 + r3 r2 0
1CCCCA ;
to write the random coecients vector as i = +Rvi where vi = (viF ; viM ; viF + viM ) and viF
and viM are standard normal random variables. After substitution, the above utilities can then
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be written as
ui0 = i0
uiF = F + r1viF + xiF + piF + iF
uiM = M + r2viM + r3viF + xiM + piM + iM
uiF+M = (F + M ) + (r1 + r3)viF + r2viM + xi(F + M + ) + (piF + piM ) + iF+M :
We estimate the parameters r1, r2 and r3, from which we can compute the variances 
2
F , 
2
M
and covariance FM . In practice, we can use a more general Cholesky matrix for three variables
R =
0BBBB@
r1 0 0
r3 r2 0
r6 r5 r4
1CCCCA ;
and impose restrictions relating to the third option, namely that r4 = 0, r5 = r2 and r6 = r1+r3.
Table 12 shows the parameter estimates for several specications. We compare a logit
and random coecients in a model without accounting for household characteristics (two left
columns) and in a model with accounting for household characteristics (two right columns). To
reduce the computational burden, the latter model only includes a selected set of interactions
between household characteristics and .
The Table shows that without accounting for the household characteristics, the random
coecients are highly signicant, in particular also the standard deviation FM , which is equal
to 0.462 with a small standard error of 0.07). The price coecient increases (in absolute value)
in the random coecients model, from -0.042 to -0.058. In contrast, in the model that accounts
for observed household characteristics, the random coecients become much smaller and are
statistically insignicant. In particular, the standard deviation FM is now 0.106 with a standard
error of 0.103. Furthermore, the price coecient and other parameters remain very similar when
the random coecients are added. These ndings indicate that there is only limited unobserved
heterogeneity once the observed household characteristics are added. We therefore focus on the
computationally simpler conditional logit model (with also household characteristics interacted
with ) in the main text.
33
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std Min Max
Cost of mobile (Euros) 160,363 10.6 4.9 1.18 29.7
Cost of xed-line (Euros) 160,363 36.9 7.9 16.3 57.4
GDP per capita (tsd Euros) 160,363 22.6 16 2.7 250
Male 160,363 0.45 0.5 0 1
Married 160,363 0.52 0.5 0 1
Age  24 160,363 0.12 0.3 0 1
Age > 24 and  34 160,363 0.15 0.4 0 1
Age > 34 and  44 160,363 0.17 0.4 0 1
Age > 44 and  54 160,363 0.17 0.4 0 1
Age > 54 and  64 160,363 0.17 0.4 0 1
Age > 64 (base) 160,363 0.22 0.4 0 1
Household size 160,363 2.51 1.1 1 4
Number of kids 160,237 0.16 0.4 0 4
Education years  15 160,363 0.2 0.4 0 1
Education years > 15 and < 20 160,363 0.43 0.5 0 1
Education years 20+ 160,363 0.27 0.4 0 1
Living in rural area (base) 160,363 0.36 0.5 0 1
Living in town 160,363 0.28 0.4 0 1
Living in city 160,363 0.37 0.5 0 1
Profession: unemployed (base) 160,363 0.08 0.3 0 1
Profession: housekeeping 160,363 0.07 0.3 0 1
Profession: student 160,363 0.08 0.3 0 1
Profession: retired 160,363 0.29 0.5 0 1
Profession: oce employee 160,363 0.08 0.3 0 1
Profession: professional 160,363 0.04 0.2 0 1
Profession: manual worker 160,363 0.14 0.3 0 1
Profession: proprietor 160,363 0.04 0.2 0 1
Profession: manager 160,363 0.07 0.3 0 1
Profession: farmer 160,363 0.01 0.1 0 1
Profession: travelling 160,363 0.1 0.3 0 1
Internet access: DSL 160,363 0.26 0.4 0 1
Internet access: cable 160,363 0.12 0.3 0 1
Internet access: dial-up 160,363 0.09 0.3 0 1
Internet access: mobile 160,363 0.03 0.2 0 1
Internet access: other 160,363 0.03 0.2 0 1
Base variable is indicated for dummy variables. In the case of Education years dummies, the reference are
households without education or with missing information.
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Table 2: Choice of voice technologies
Fixed-line
No Yes Total
Mobile No 5,775 19,567 25,342
Yes 46,471 88,550 135,021
Total 52,246 108,117 160,363
Table 3: Choice of voice technologies oered by incumbent and competitor
Fixed-line
None Incumbent Competitor Total
Mobile None 3,297 8,459 835 12,591
Incumbent 4,091 10,227 1,423 15,741
Competitor 8,993 12,995 3,086 25,074
Total 16,381 31,681 5,344 53,406
Table 4: Choice of voice and broadband technologies
DSL Dial-up Cable modem Mobile Other None Total
Mobile only 6,210 1,155 7,183 3,019 3,008 26,710 47,285
Fixed-line only 1,325 774 497 50 129 16,861 19,636
Mobile+ Fixed-line 33,470 12,253 11,447 2,259 2,656 29,133 91,218
None 79 26 88 15 29 5,544 5,781
Total 41,084 14,208 19,215 5,343 5,822 78,248 163,920
The total number 163,920 is greater than the number of observations 160,363 because of some households having
more than one internet technology.
Table 5: Households with connections to dierent internet technologies
DSL Dial-up Cable modem Mobile Other None Total
DSL 0 740 307 1,091 134 38,812 41,084
Dial-up 98 141 179 59 12,893 13,370
Cable modem 0 447 80 18,240 18,767
Mobile 0 95 3,531 3,626
Other 186 5,082 5,268
None 78,248 78,248
160,363
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Table 6: Choice model for voice services
Base model Base model + Incumbent
Mobile Fixed-line Mobile+Fixed () Mobile Fixed-line Mobile+Fixed ()
Price -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.041*** -0.041***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Price residual 0.022*** 0.022*** -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Intercept -0.423*** 3.642*** -0.733*** -1.425*** 0.716*** -0.238
(0.105) (0.123) (0.114) (0.153) (0.182) (0.166)
CEE dummy 0.132*** -0.621*** -0.409*** -0.158** -1.073*** 0.225**
(0.027) (0.033) (0.038) (0.080) (0.079) (0.089)
GDP per capita 1.412*** 1.234*** -0.835*** 0.956*** 0.410*** -0.138**
(0.029) (0.032) (0.034) (0.051) (0.050) (0.057)
Bundle 2.153*** 1.442***
(0.048) (0.072)
Incumbent -0.517*** 1.334*** 0.398***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.021)
Year dummy: 2006 0.055 -0.431*** 0.090* 0.102** -0.282*** -0.002
(0.046) (0.047) (0.051) (0.043) (0.043) (0.048)
Year dummy: 2007 0.219*** -0.630*** 0.194***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.053)
Year dummy: 2009 1.068*** -0.200*** -0.353***
(0.054) (0.055) (0.058)
Year dummy: 2010 1.289*** -0.378*** -0.212***
(0.056) (0.059) (0.062)
Year dummy: 2011 1.309*** -0.409*** -0.260***
(0.055) (0.058) (0.061)
Observations 641,452 405,902
Number of households 130,363 53,199
Base model: choices of voice connections with substitution parameters for two groups of CEE and WE
countries. The regressions include household characteristics which are reported in Table 7. Base model +
incumbent: choices of voice connections from incumbent vs. competitor. The regression includes household
characteristics which are reported in Table B.5.
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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Table 7: Choice model for voice services: household characteristics eects
Base model
Mobile Fixed-line Mobile+Fixed ()
Living in city 0.742*** 0.627*** -0.469***
(0.043) (0.045) (0.047)
Living in town 0.516*** 0.247*** -0.276***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.039)
Male -0.372*** -0.557*** 0.501***
(0.032) (0.034) (0.036)
Married 0.387*** 0.343*** -0.078*
(0.037) (0.039) (0.041)
Household size 0.129*** 0.304*** 0.078***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.024)
Number of kids -0.133*** -0.288*** 0.176***
(0.044) (0.051) (0.053)
Age > 24 and  34 1.980*** -2.266*** 0.539***
(0.093) (0.120) (0.125)
Age > 34 and  44 2.032*** -2.076*** 0.222**
(0.078) (0.091) (0.096)
Age > 44 and  54 1.568*** -1.543*** 0.116
(0.073) (0.080) (0.085)
Age > 54 and  64 1.091*** -1.056*** 0.095
(0.062) (0.064) (0.070)
Age > 64 0.906*** -0.485*** 0.006
(0.047) (0.046) (0.052)
Education years 15- 0.341*** 0.332*** -0.285***
(0.071) (0.069) (0.083)
Education years > 15 and  20 1.107*** 0.778*** -0.337***
(0.072) (0.071) (0.083)
Education years 20+ 1.699*** 1.280*** -0.493***
(0.086) (0.086) (0.097)
Profession: housekeeping -0.058 -0.593*** 0.355***
(0.071) (0.081) (0.086)
Prefession: student 2.081*** 1.256*** -0.161
(0.136) (0.167) (0.175)
Profession: retired 0.184*** 0.004 0.140*
(0.066) (0.066) (0.072)
Profession: oce employee 1.413*** 0.603*** -0.228*
(0.124) (0.134) (0.137)
Profession: professional 1.170*** 0.185 0.378**
(0.161) (0.179) (0.182)
Profession: manual worker 0.779*** 0.067 -0.097
(0.071) (0.077) (0.081)
Profession: proprietor 1.828*** 1.058*** -0.515***
(0.175) (0.185) (0.188)
Profession: manager 1.263*** 0.674*** -0.260*
(0.143) (0.151) (0.154)
Profession: farmer -0.066 0.289** 0.135
(0.114) (0.118) (0.132)
Profession: travelling 1.387*** 0.590*** -0.415***
(0.105) (0.113) (0.116)
Observations 640,948
Households 160,363
Base model: choices of voice connections with substitution parameters for two groups of CEE and WE countries.
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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Table 8: Own and cross price elasticities
Fixed-line Mobile
Fixed-line -0.43 0.021
Mobile 0.021 -0.21
Table 9: Choice model for voice services and broadband internet
Base model + Broadband
Mobile Fixed-line Mobile Broadband Broadband Broadband
+Fixed () +Mobile (M ) +Fixed (F )
Price -0.053*** -0.053***
(0.002) (0.002)
Price residual 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.002)
Intercept -0.714*** 3.583*** -0.278**
(0.108) (0.127) (0.116)
CEE dummy 0.123*** -0.621*** -0.394***
(0.029) (0.034) (0.039)
GDP per capita 1.371*** 1.120*** -0.976*** 0.814***
(0.030) (0.033) (0.035) (0.010)
Dial-up connection -8.016*** 1.032*** 2.465***
(0.078) (0.041) (0.035)
DSL connection -6.782*** 1.519*** 1.782***
(0.068) (0.032) (0.019)
Cable connection -6.522*** 1.421*** 0.545***
(0.078) (0.049) (0.020)
Mobile broadband -7.907*** 1.795*** -0.840***
(0.196) (0.186) (0.040)
Other broadband -7.279*** 1.266*** -0.066**
(0.113) (0.094) (0.031)
Bundle 1.564*** 0.648*** 3.497***
(0.054) (0.096) (0.041)
Year dummy: 2006 0.024 0.158*** 0.085* -0.439***
(0.052) (0.022) (0.047) (0.047)
Year dummy: 2007 0.003 0.514*** 0.278*** -0.682***
(0.054) (0.022) (0.049) (0.050)
Year dummy: 2009 -0.726*** 1.143*** 1.134*** -0.392***
(0.060) (0.023) (0.055) (0.056)
Year dummy: 2010 -0.693*** 1.540*** 1.354*** -0.641***
(0.064) (0.023) (0.059) (0.061)
Year dummy: 2011 -0.741*** 1.549*** 1.373*** -0.670***
(0.063) (0.023) (0.058) (0.060)
Observations 2,980,416
Households 130,363
Base model + Broadband: choices of voice and broadband connections. The regression include household
characteristics which are reported in Table B.5.
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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Table 10: The impact of mobile on xed-line and mobile: predicted penetration in 2006 and
2011
2006
mobile (std) xed-line (std) mobile+xed (std) none (std)
current 77.9% (0.8%) 66.9% (0.7%) 51.0% (0.5%) 6.2% (0.1%)
of which incumbent 38.1% (0.4%) 57.5% (0.5%)
no mobile 0.0% (0.0%) 72.8% (0.8%) 0.0% (0.0%) 27.2% (0.7%)
of which incumbent 0.0% (0.0%) 61.5% (0.6%)
mobile price as in 2006 77.8% (0.8%) 66.9% (0.7%) 50.9% (0.5%) 6.2% (0.1%)
of which incumbent 37.4% (0.4%) 57.4% (0.5%)
no xed-mobile bundle 77.7% (0.8%) 66.4% (0.7%) 50.3% (0.5%) 6.2% (0.1%)
of which incumbent 38.1% (0.4%) 57.0% (0.5%)
no incumbent's xed-mobile advantage 76.9% (0.8%) 65.0% (0.7%) 48.3% (0.5%) 6.4% (0.1%)
of which incumbent 32.7% (0.4%) 54.8% (0.6%)
no incumbent's mobile 71.1% (0.6%) 65.7% (0.6%) 44.5% (0.4%) 7.7% (0.2%)
of which incumbent 0.0% (0.0%) 55.5% (0.5%)
2011
mobile (std) xed-line (std) mobile+xed (std) none (std)
current 89.9% (0.5%) 63.1% (0.4%) 53.4% (0.3%) 2.4% (0.1%)
of which incumbent
no mobile 0.0% (0.0%) 77.3% (0.7%) 0.0% (0.0%) 22.7% (0.7%)
of which incumbent
mobile price as in 2006 88.5% (0.5%) 63.3% (0.4%) 52.9% (0.3%) 2.6% (0.1%)
of which incumbent
no xed-mobile bundle 89.7% (0.6%) 61.9% (0.4%) 52.5% (0.0%) 2.4% (0.1%)
of which incumbent
no incumbent's xed-mobile advantage n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
of which incumbent
no incumbent's mobile n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
of which incumbent
Predicted mobile and xed-line penetration for: (i) Current: current situation; (ii) No mobiles: no mobile
telephones available; (iii) Mobile prices as in 2005; (iv) No mobile+xed bundle: zero value of mobile+xed
bundle; (v) No incumbent's xed-mobile advantage: no additional utility from using mobile and xed-line from
incumbent. The standard deviations are calculated for 100 random draws from the distribution of parameters.
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Table 11: The impact of broadband on xed-line: predicted mobile and xed-line penetration
in 2006 and 2011
2006
mobile (std) xed-line (std) mobile+xed (std) none (std)
Current 79.0% (0.9%) 69.1% (0.8%) 53.1% (0.5%) 5.0% (0.1%)
No Internet 75.8% (0.6%) 61.9% (0.5%) 43.6% (0.3%) 5.9% (0.1%)
No DSL 77.5% (0.8%) 62.7% (0.7%) 45.7% (0.5%) 5.5% (0.1%)
No bundle xed+Internet 79.1% (0.9%) 66.5% (0.8%) 50.8% (0.5%) 5.1% (0.1%)
No bundle mobile+Internet 79.0% (0.9%) 69.1% (0.8%) 53.1% (0.5%) 5.0% (0.1%)
2011
mobile (std) xed-line (std) mobile+xed (std) none (std)
Current 89.9% (1.1%) 63.0% (0.8%) 55.1% (0.6%) 2.3% (0.1%)
No Internet 86.4% (0.6%) 53.2% (0.5%) 42.7% (0.3%) 3.1% (0.1%)
No DSL 88.6% (1.1%) 54.3% (0.8%) 45.5% (0.6%) 2.6% (0.1%)
No bundle xed+Internet 90.3% (1.2%) 53.2% (0.7%) 45.9% (0.5%) 2.4% (0.1%)
No bundle mobile+Internet 89.8% (1.1%) 63.0% (0.8%) 55.1% (0.6%) 2.3% (0.1%)
Predicted mobile and xed-line penetration for: (i) Current: current situation; (ii) No broadband: no broadband
available (iii) No DSL: no DSL broadband available; (iv) No bundle xed+internet: zero value of xed+internet
bundle. The standard deviations are calculated for 100 random draws from the distribution of parameters.
Table 12: Choice model for voice services: comparison logit and random coecients logit
no household characteristics household characteristics
logit rc logit logit rc logit
2M 0.849*** 0.293**
(0.111) (0.145)
MF 0.626*** 0,053
(0.040) (0.089)
2F 0.462*** 0,106
(0.072) (0.103)
Price -0.042*** -0.058*** -0.040*** -0.046***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
M 2.831*** 4.133*** -0.811*** -0.883***
(0.018) (0.069) (0.133) (0.175)
F 3.344*** 4.910*** 2.770*** 2.973***
(0.033) (0.089) (0.134) (0.179)
 -0.782*** -1.488*** -0.506*** -0.694***
(0.017) (0.037) (0.043) (0.112)
CEE (M, F and F+M) included included included included
GDP (M, F and F+M) included included included included
Household characteristics excluded excluded included included
Observations 641,452 641,452 128,188 128,188
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1. For computational reasons we use only 20%
of the total sample in the estimation of random coecients mode.
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Appendix B
Table B.1: Sample size by country
2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 Sum
Austria 1,019 1,029 1,012 1,001 1,030 1,047 6,138
Belgium 1,011 1,009 1,004 1,003 1,025 1,033 6,085
Bulgaria 1,002 1,023 1,000 1,007 1,001 1,001 6,034
Cyprus 507 504 505 502 500 503 3,021
Czech Republic 1,012 1150 1169 1,096 1,014 995 6,436
Germany 1,515 1,504 1,519 1,522 1,622 1,562 9,244
Denmark 1,039 1,037 1,000 1,008 1,013 1,011 6,108
Estonia 1,000 1,000 1,002 1,000 1,003 1,000 6,005
Greece 999 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 999 5,998
Spain 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,023 1,004 1,010 6,037
Finland 1,023 1,028 1,038 1,041 1,001 1,002 6,133
France 1,031 1,012 1,024 1,005 1,035 1,051 6,158
Hungary 1,010 1,000 1,000 1,017 1,029 1,012 6,068
Ireland 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,014 1,007 1,014 6,035
Italy 1,011 1,038 1,039 1,039 1,027 1,011 6,165
Lithuania 1,022 1,025 1,018 1,027 1,029 1,025 6,146
Luxembourg 500 502 500 502 503 507 3,014
Latvia 1,046 1,019 1,009 1,004 1,014 1,021 6,113
Malta 500 500 500 500 500 500 3,000
Netherlands 1127 1,020 1,000 1,004 1,012 1,008 6,171
Poland 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 6,000
Portugal 1,004 1,004 1,000 1,038 1,010 1,005 6,061
Romania 1,003 1,000 1,000 1,008 1,053 1,034 6,098
Sweden 1,009 1,014 1,015 1,014 1,024 1,023 6,099
Slovenia 1,028 1,019 1,016 1,017 1,018 1,014 6,112
Slovakia 1,015 1,003 1,055 1,047 1,040 999 6,159
United Kingdom 1,310 1,315 1,305 1,322 1,322 1,306 7,880
Sum 26,743 26,755 26,730 26,761 26,836 26,693 160,518
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Table B.2: Households with xed-line access by country (%)
Country 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011
Austria 0.69 0.58 0.58 0.50 0.48 0.47
Belgium 0.77 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.71
Bulgaria 0.68 0.70 0.65 0.62 0.51 0.53
Cyprus 0.91 0.88 0.89 0.84 0.85 0.77
Czech Republic 0.54 0.44 0.35 0.24 0.17 0.19
Germany 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.88
Denmark 0.86 0.84 0.80 0.73 0.68 0.66
Estonia 0.63 0.52 0.60 0.54 0.51 0.52
Greece 0.87 0.83 0.83 0.80 0.84 0.83
Spain 0.77 0.76 0.73 0.70 0.72 0.71
Finland 0.57 0.51 0.44 0.33 0.26 0.24
France 0.86 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.89 0.90
Hungary 0.68 0.48 0.45 0.54 0.49 0.49
Ireland 0.83 0.76 0.82 0.73 0.69 0.69
Italy 0.68 0.53 0.58 0.69 0.66 0.69
Lithuania 0.44 0.39 0.38 0.42 0.36 0.35
Luxembourg 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.91
Latvia 0.56 0.47 0.52 0.48 0.49 0.39
Malta 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.96
Netherlands 0.97 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.88
Poland 0.71 0.69 0.65 0.55 0.49 0.46
Portugal 0.56 0.63 0.43 0.54 0.61 0.62
Romania 0.53 0.42 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.45
Sweden 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99
Slovenia 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.78
Slovakia 0.59 0.53 0.49 0.41 0.38 0.32
United Kingdom 0.90 0.88 0.87 0.82 0.87 0.86
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Table B.3: Households with mobile access by country (%)
Country 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011
Austria 0.80 0.82 0.89 0.90 0.92 0.93
Belgium 0.81 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.91 0.89
Bulgaria 0.47 0.53 0.62 0.77 0.82 0.78
Cyprus 0.76 0.72 0.83 0.90 0.93 0.96
Czech Republic 0.88 0.90 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.96
Germany 0.75 0.78 0.81 0.80 0.85 0.87
Denmark 0.85 0.85 0.91 0.92 0.95 0.95
Estonia 0.75 0.82 0.85 0.90 0.93 0.92
Greece 0.68 0.70 0.75 0.81 0.90 0.91
Spain 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.86 0.87 0.87
Finland 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.95
France 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.82 0.85 0.88
Hungary 0.68 0.68 0.75 0.80 0.86 0.85
Ireland 0.82 0.86 0.89 0.92 0.94 0.94
Italy 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.95 0.93 0.94
Lithuania 0.70 0.77 0.82 0.90 0.93 0.93
Luxembourg 0.86 0.88 0.91 0.90 0.95 0.95
Latvia 0.72 0.79 0.86 0.91 0.95 0.95
Malta 0.73 0.80 0.79 0.85 0.89 0.82
Netherlands 0.88 0.90 0.91 0.94 0.95 0.94
Poland 0.59 0.65 0.72 0.78 0.84 0.82
Portugal 0.64 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.84 0.85
Romania 0.50 0.62 0.66 0.74 0.85 0.81
Sweden 0.95 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.94
Slovenia 0.87 0.82 0.85 0.91 0.91 0.92
Slovakia 0.73 0.80 0.83 0.91 0.91 0.92
United Kingdom 0.80 0.81 0.85 0.85 0.90 0.88
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Table B.4: Households with xed-line and mobile access by country (%)
Country 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011
Austria 0.51 0.43 0.49 0.41 0.41 0.40
Belgium 0.60 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.62 0.62
Bulgaria 0.33 0.37 0.44 0.47 0.41 0.39
Cyprus 0.68 0.60 0.72 0.74 0.78 0.73
Czech Republic 0.45 0.37 0.31 0.21 0.16 0.18
Germany 0.65 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.74 0.76
Denmark 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.65 0.63 0.61
Estonia 0.44 0.39 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.46
Greece 0.57 0.55 0.59 0.62 0.74 0.74
Spain 0.54 0.56 0.54 0.59 0.60 0.60
Finland 0.49 0.43 0.37 0.28 0.23 0.19
France 0.62 0.58 0.64 0.73 0.74 0.78
Hungary 0.43 0.30 0.31 0.39 0.41 0.40
Ireland 0.67 0.65 0.72 0.66 0.64 0.64
Italy 0.58 0.47 0.52 0.65 0.61 0.65
Lithuania 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.36 0.31 0.30
Luxembourg 0.82 0.83 0.87 0.83 0.88 0.86
Latvia 0.37 0.36 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.37
Malta 0.72 0.77 0.76 0.83 0.87 0.79
Netherlands 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.83
Poland 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.39 0.38 0.34
Portugal 0.33 0.46 0.33 0.42 0.51 0.51
Romania 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.36
Sweden 0.95 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.92
Slovenia 0.75 0.70 0.72 0.75 0.76 0.70
Slovakia 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.31 0.27
United Kingdom 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.68 0.78 0.75
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Table B.5: Choice models for voice and internet services: household characteristics eect
Base model + Incumbent Base model + Broadband
Mobile Fixed-line Mobile+Fixed () Mobile Fixed-line Mobile+Fixed () Broadband
Living in city 0.749*** 0.547*** -0.479*** 0.816*** 0.648*** -0.602*** 0.235***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.065) (0.045) (0.046) (0.048) (0.017)
Living in town 0.496*** 0.253*** -0.335*** 0.550*** 0.241*** -0.404*** 0.186***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.055) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.015)
Male -0.154*** -0.401*** 0.448*** -0.394*** -0.598*** 0.500*** 0.249***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.051) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036) (0.014)
Married 0.331*** 0.267*** -0.052 0.412*** 0.343*** -0.200*** 0.184***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.058) (0.038) (0.040) (0.042) (0.016)
Household size 0.069** 0.336*** 0.086*** 0.120*** 0.266*** 0.031 0.310***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.033) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.008)
Number of kids -0.124** -0.263*** 0.125* -0.138*** -0.293*** 0.147*** 0.033**
(0.060) (0.066) (0.070) (0.046) (0.053) (0.055) (0.017)
Age > 24 and  34 2.649*** -2.028*** 0.201 1.969*** -2.443*** 0.125 1.347***
(0.137) (0.170) (0.181) (0.097) (0.124) (0.128) (0.039)
Age > 34 and  44 2.490*** -1.727*** -0.031 2.028*** -2.254*** -0.173* 1.298***
(0.110) (0.122) (0.134) (0.081) (0.094) (0.098) (0.032)
Age > 44 and  54 1.860*** -1.269*** -0.078 1.526*** -1.744*** -0.239*** 1.272***
(0.104) (0.107) (0.121) (0.076) (0.082) (0.087) (0.031)
Age > 54 and  64 1.404*** -0.732*** -0.192* 1.110*** -1.182*** -0.269*** 1.141***
(0.089) (0.086) (0.102) (0.063) (0.066) (0.071) (0.029)
Age > 64 1.016*** -0.332*** -0.050 0.924*** -0.566*** -0.235*** 0.793***
(0.069) (0.062) (0.078) (0.047) (0.047) (0.053) (0.024)
Education years 15- 0.656*** 0.502*** -0.421*** 0.417*** 0.328*** -0.031 -0.505***
(0.110) (0.094) (0.128) (0.073) (0.070) (0.083) (0.048)
Education years > 15 and  20 1.326*** 0.986*** -0.520*** 1.136*** 0.687*** -0.264*** 0.323***
(0.110) (0.098) (0.129) (0.073) (0.072) (0.084) (0.046)
Education years 20+ 1.629*** 1.373*** -0.541*** 1.691*** 1.126*** -0.628*** 1.048***
(0.123) (0.113) (0.141) (0.090) (0.090) (0.100) (0.047)
Profession: housekeeping -0.077 -0.496*** 0.086 -0.069 -0.596*** 0.264*** -0.027
(0.102) (0.110) (0.123) (0.073) (0.083) (0.088) (0.033)
Prefession: student 1.798*** 1.322*** -0.346 1.910*** 0.958*** -0.417** 1.536***
(0.188) (0.222) (0.242) (0.147) (0.177) (0.184) (0.059)
Profession: retired 0.204** 0.039 -0.140 0.189*** 0.042 -0.026 0.057*
(0.092) (0.086) (0.101) (0.066) (0.066) (0.072) (0.030)
Profession: oce employee 1.224*** 0.604*** -0.252 1.465*** 0.630*** -0.616*** 0.674***
(0.163) (0.174) (0.181) (0.141) (0.149) (0.152) (0.032)
Profession: professional 1.198*** 0.248 0.180 0.955*** -0.091 0.157 1.075***
(0.210) (0.229) (0.238) (0.179) (0.194) (0.197) (0.043)
Profession: manual worker 0.620*** 0.030 -0.255** 0.775*** 0.092 -0.324*** 0.125***
(0.097) (0.101) (0.111) (0.073) (0.078) (0.082) (0.029)
Profession: proprietor 1.393*** 0.891*** -0.493** 2.036*** 1.266*** -1.115*** 0.647***
(0.209) (0.219) (0.227) (0.209) (0.216) (0.219) (0.038)
Profession: manager 1.037*** 0.485*** -0.104 1.202*** 0.572*** -0.605*** 1.048***
(0.177) (0.187) (0.194) (0.170) (0.176) (0.179) (0.036)
Profession: farmer -0.398** 0.184 0.170 -0.074 0.396*** 0.113 -0.329***
(0.173) (0.161) (0.199) (0.115) (0.119) (0.132) (0.062)
Profession: travelling 1.177*** 0.550*** -0.471*** 1.393*** 0.589*** -0.748*** 0.547***
(0.139) (0.147) (0.154) (0.114) (0.121) (0.124) (0.030)
Observations 405,902 2,980,416
Households 53,199 156,864
(i) Base model + Incumbent: choices of voice connections from incumbent vs. competitor; (ii) Base model +
Broadband: choices of voice and broadband connections.
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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